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The Development of the Brazilian Bio-electricity Market: 






The  emergence  of  bio-energy  markets  have  been  studied  all  over  the  world  (CBES, 
2009).  Questions  regarding  government  programs  and  interventions  in  the  development  of 
bioenergy  markets  are  the  main  focus  of  researchers.  Specifically,  commentators  argue  that 
bioenergy programs have adversely distorted the economics of agricultural markets (Business 
Week 2007). Brazil provides an instrumental case for analyzing how the deregulation process in 
the  sugarcane  industry  creates  new  opportunities  for  alternative  energy  production,  such  as 
biomass electricity. Institutional interventions and the privatization process in both the sugarcane 
and  the  electrical  sectors  have  linked  capacity  for  clean  energy  production  with  increasing 
demand for alternative electricity. 
  This study is divided into seven sections. First, it describes the sugarcane and energy 
sectors  from  the  early  1900’s  through  1990  when  New  Economy  concepts  started  being 
implemented worldwide. Second, this paper presents how the national government has gradually 
decreased its intervention in the sugarcane industry. The third section tackles how institutional 
changes in the electrical sector have created opportunities for alternative energy production. In 
the fourth section an integrated approach is made in order to associate the sugarcane industry and 
its opportunities in the bio-electricity market with the new organization of the electrical sector. 
The fifth section discusses current national government’s interventions. The sixth section briefly 
describes future studies. Finally, the seventh section concludes the paper. 2 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Government programs and institutional reforms have always been part of the Brazilian 
energy sector. After 1929, the federal government intensely regulated the energy sector as a way 
to relieve the harm caused by the global economic downturn. While the world was trying to 
rebuild its economy, many governments assumed the position of players in the most important 
sectors of the economy. In the mid 1930’s, the United States government announced the well-
known Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act which raised the tariffs on international goods in defense of 
U.S. national recovery (IRWIN, 1998). Starting after the economic collapse of 1929, countries 
explicitly assumed nationalist positions as a response to the crisis and imposed national programs 
of revitalization. Brazil focused its efforts on domestic market protection and job creation. 
  As one of the strongest agricultural exporters in the world, Brazil was vulnerable to the 
international  downturn.  Trying  to  reorganize  its  internal  markets  and  looking  at  the  most 
important exports, among them sugar, the federal government established the Sugar and Ethanol 
Institute  (IAA)  in  1933.  IAAs’  role  was  to  plan  and  control  the  annual  sugar  and  ethanol 
production as well as the amount of sugarcane delivered to each plant. According to the IAA act, 
no sugarcane processor could be established without authorization. The institute regulated the 
amount of ethanol and sugar to be produced in each state. Between 1933 and 1990, the IAA was 
the main vehicle for the national governments’ intervention in the sugarcane sector. Depending 
upon the historical period, the IAA and other federal organizations either supported ethanol and 
sugar production or limited it at the national or the state level. 
As both sugar and ethanol are derived from sugarcane, the government programs had a 
major impact on the agricultural sector. In the 1970’s, well-known programs such as the National 
Sugarcane Breeding Program, National Facility Modernization Program and Proálcool (Ethanol 3 
 
Program) were announced in order to increase sugar exports and decrease dependency on foreign 
oil. 
Proálcool  was  the first  bioenergy  program  which  had  large impacts  on  the  domestic 
market and consumers’ choices. During the thirty  years after the initiation of Proálcool, the 
ethanol  production  increased  30  times,  yield  per hectare increased  60%  and  production cost 
declined by 75% (Nass et al., 2007). By December 1980, ethanol car sales represented 76% of 
total car sales. The main purpose of the program was to motivate the production of and demand 
for  alternative  fuel  as  a  reaction  to  the  increasing  price  of  oil  on  the  international  market. 
However, increasing federal debts and lack of support for new investments ended the program in 
1989 when international oil prices started stabilizing after the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-
1988). As a result, people who had invested in ethanol cars (E-100) were unable to find fuel and 
changed consumption back to gasoline cars. Ethanol was no longer competitive to gasoline given 
the international prices for sugar and oil. When Proálcool ended, ethanol cars were no longer 
economically efficient. Consumers again embraced ethanol as a fuel only in 2003 when flex-fuel 
technology was first introduced in Brazil. 
  The  electrical  sector  has  followed  a  slightly  different  sequence  of  government 
interventions until 1990’s when privatization measures started being adopted on both sectors. 
Market protection for the electrical sector began in 1943 when the federal government started 
investing  in  transmission  improvements  and  intervening  in  the  electrical  sector  as  a  whole. 
Before 1943, transmission and distribution services were concentrated in two foreign companies.  
Brazilian Traction Light & Power Co. (a Canadian company) and American & Foreign Power 
Co. (an American company) were responsible for 70% of the capacity for electricity generation 
in  Brazil  (LEITE,  2009).  The  national  intervention  took  place  with  the  establishment  of 4 
 
Eletrobrás in 1961, a state-owned company which became responsible for managing generation, 
transmission and distribution activities across the country. State intervention in the electrical 
sector ended in April of 1990 when the National Privatization Program was launched through 
Law 8,031. 
  Since 1990, new patterns have been traced by the federal government supported by the 
Federal Constitution of 1988. Based on democratic and open economy principles, the Brazilian 
government decided to minimize its interventions. The nationals’ role has changed since 1988: it 
moved from interventions to the establishment of free-markets and regulation measures where 
free-markets cannot properly operate.  
 
THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE SUGARCANE SECTOR 
  Initiated by the National Privatization Program, the Brazilian economy began following 
New Economy concepts in 1990. Due to the complex interaction between ethanol/sugar markets 
and government interventions, the deregulation program was rescheduled several times. During 
the national intervention period, the agricultural market for sugarcane was related to the market 
for  ethanol  and  sugar.  The  Sugar  and  Ethanol  Institute  (IAA)  decisions  were  first  based  on 
market predictions and stock levels for food and energy security purposes. Then seasonal plans 
were released informing farmers and processors of the amount of sugarcane to be processed and 
the price to be paid. Describing how sugarcane prices and acreage moved from government-level 
to firm-level decisions can only be explained by presenting the changes in the sugarcane industry 
as a whole. 
The first move towards the privatization was the termination of IAA in 1990. In 1991, 
national organizations and ministries became responsible for IAA tasks. At first, the Ministry of 
Economy dealt with prices for sugarcane, ethanol, sugar and petroleum-based fuel; the Secretary 5 
 
of Regional Development (SDR) was responsible for production aspects of sugarcane, ethanol 
and  sugar;  the  National  Fuel Department  (DNC)  was  responsible  for  supply  mechanisms  of 
petroleum-based  fuels  and  ethanol.  Besides  the  high  complexity  observed  in  the  sugarcane 
sector, the fragmented administration postponed the deregulation process even more. Effective 
measures regarding ethanol and sugarcane prices were taken only after 1997 through the Sugar 
and Ethanol Interministry Council (CIMA). Given social, economic and environmental issues 
associated with the sector, sugarcane and related products had their prices totally deregulated 
after  February  of  1999  (MORAES  &  SHIKIDA,  2000).  Although the  National  Privatization 
Program has been completed, the Federal government still partially intervenes in the fuel market. 
The current federal and state interventions in the fuel market will be briefly discussed in the fifth 
section. 
In 1990, sugar was the first product to be deregulated because of its low input on national 
security. In May of 1997 the price of anhydrous ethanol (used as oxygenate on gasoline) was 
completely deregulated. Hydrated ethanol prices and production were deregulated by the State 
two years later (MARJOTTA-MAISTRO, 2002). Since then, ANP (Petroleum National Agency) 
has been controlling the anhydrous and hydrated ethanol standards. Both anhydrous and hydrated 
ethanol are now traded through competitive markets. With the development of the world-wide 
ethanol  market,  anhydrous  ethanol  is  negotiated  mainly  through  BM&F/BOVESPA  and 
CME/Chicago whereas hydrated ethanol is traded as contracts between buyers and sellers. 
The  most  important  reason  that  sugarcane  market  deregulation  had  been  postponed 
several  years was the lack of information on the raw-material pricing. In 1997 UNICA was 
established as a sugarcane processors’ organization in the Central-South region of Brazil. Along 
with ORPLANA (Sugarcane Growers Association), UNICA presented a new model of payment 6 
 
for  the  sugarcane  crop  in  April  of  1998.  The  payment  model  called  CONSECANA  has 
substituted for the state-defined price in the majority of the transactions between growers and 
processors since May of 1998. Few farmers and processors still prefer to set up contracts of raw-
material  price  and  quality.  However,  the  CONSECANA  model  is  designed  to  engage  all 
potential factors of variation in quality and estimate a fair price in terms of Kg of ATR/metric-
ton of sugarcane
1. 
With  the  agricultural  market  completely  deregulated,  firms  started  looking  for  new 
enterprises.  The  successful  cases  of  organic  sugar  and  biodegradable  plastic  production  are 
examples  of  opportunities  in  which  sugarcane  processors  can  invest.  The  most  common 
enterprise  adopted  by  sugarcane  processors  is  bio-electricity  generation  based  on  residuals 
(bagasse and recovered trash
2) from the sugar/ethanol production process. Many factors such as 
availability  of  technology,  incentive  programs  promoted  by  the  government,  environmental 
pressures and the increasing demand for alternative power have pushed decision makers toward 
bio-electricity generation. However, institutional and legal changes in the electrical sector are 
needed to make this diversification in production possible. 
The next section will tackle the deregulation and legal changes that the electrical sector 
has  gone  through  and  will  explore  how  these  changes  have  created  opportunities  for  bio-
electricity producers. Table 1 describes the main events that have readied the sugarcane sector 
for bio-electricity market creation. 
                                                           
1 The appendix A briefly presents the current CONSECANA model 
2 Agricultural residue recovered at the field after the harvest of sugarcane 7 
 
Table 1: Events in the sugarcane sector in Brazil 
Event  Year  Details 
Law 8,031  1990  National Privatization Program launched 
Law 8,029  1990  Sugar and Ethanol Institute (IAA) expires 
Rule n
o. 79  1990  Sugar production has become deregulated 
Administrative  reform  on 
Fernando Collor mandate 
1991  Ministry  of  Economy,  Secretary  of  Regional 
Development (SDR) and National Fuel Department 
(DNC) responsible for IAA tasks. 
Formal  organization  of 
Sugarcane processors  
Apr 1997  Establishment of UNICA 
Rule n
o. 294  May 1997  Anhydrous ethanol production deregulated 
Decree (DOU 08/22/1997)  Aug1997  Sugar and Ethanol Interministry Council (CIMA) 
Law 9,478  Aug 1997  Establishment of ANP 
UNICA  presentation  at 
BM&F Board of Trade 
Apr 1998  CONSECANA methodology released 
  May 1998  Sugarcane production deregulated 
  1999  Hydrated ethanol production deregulated 
Source:  MORAES  &  SHIKIDA  (2000),  MARJOTTA-MAISTRO  (2002),  and  Brazilian 
Government website. 
 
DEREGULATION AND LEGAL CHANGES IN THE ELECTRICAL SECTOR 
  Following the National Deregulation Program, legal and institutional changes were made 
in the electrical sector. Because of the New Economy perspective, electricity prices had to be 
deregulated where a competitive market could fairly operate.  
Moving from a protected market, the first step toward openness was Law 8,987 released 
in 1995.  It settled concession rules that the Brazilian Privatization Plan (PND) followed from 
1996 to 2000 when conceding rights for private companies to provide basic services. Although 
the privatization process of the electrical sector did not properly affect the bio-electricity market 
creation, its related laws have certainly created conditions for the establishment of a competitive 
market. 
Between 1996 and 1998, the federal program (RE-SEB project) took place in Brazil with 
the  specific  objective  of  instituting  perfect  competition  for  the  product  (electric  power)  and 8 
 
regulating the services (distribution and transmission services). According to ALMEIDA (1995), 
the finest consequence of the RE-SEB project was the separation between product and services. 
As cited in PND, federal Laws 8,631/1993 and 8,987/1995
3 introduced the first changes that 
founded the current electric energy sector. Law 8,631 eliminated the system of price equalization 
and  guaranteed  remuneration,  and  made  it  obligatory  for  generators  and  distributors  to  sign 
contracts  defining  prices.  Law  8,987  deals  with  conditions  of  competition  in  tenders  for 
electricity  generation  and  transmission  projects.  It  also  establishes  rules  for  public  service 
concessions, and provides assistance for the privatization process. In addition, it classifies as free 
consumers those with a load equal to or higher than 10mW  and voltage  greater than 69kV. 
Accordingly, free consumers can openly choose which electricity producer (or concessionaire) 
and related source of electricity they will be supplied with. This law also creates the legal entity 
of independent electricity producers which in some sense founded the primary scenario for the 
competitive bio-electricity market. An independent electricity producer is defined as one allowed 
to consume either all or part of the energy produced and sell the remaining product. 
At this point, two market environments were created: (i) a free contracting environment 
where free consumers choose their suppliers and the related source for energy production; and 
(ii)  a  captive  environment  where  consumers  cannot  choose  which  company  supplies  their 
electricity. As enacted by Law 9,074, new consumers (those established after 2000) with power 
demand greater than 3mW were also qualified as free consumers and could integrate the free 
contracting market regardless of their demanded voltage. 
Some commentators argue that all the measures taken before 1997 were inconsistent and 
uncoordinated  (PIRES,  1999).  From  this  perspective,  the  new  institutional  model  was  first 
introduced by Laws 9,427/1996 that established the National Electricity Agency (ANEEL) and 
                                                           
3 implemented through Law 9,074/1995 9 
 
9,648/1998  which  defined  rules  for  entry,  taxes  and  market  structure.  The  creation  of  an 
independent agency represented a milestone in the regulatory reform of the Brazilian electrical 
sector. According to these commentators, the previous Laws had no effective changes because a 
neutral  party  was  missing  in  the  resolution  of  disputes  and  adoption  of  measures.  Law 
9,427/1996 established ANEEL’s legal nature as an autonomous body and defined its roles as (i) 
introduction of competition into the electricity generation and commercialization segments; (ii) 
creation of regulation mechanisms that prevents market concentration; and (iii) mediation of 
disputes arising from diverging interests of the government, utility providers and consumers. 
ANEEL’s subordinate agency, the Electric Power Commercialization Chamber (CCEE) 
has become  responsible for electricity marketing through  Law 10,848/2004. CCEE has been 
responsible for both captive and free contracting environments and for the spot market. In the 
captive  environment,  CCEE  holds  least-price  auctions  and  validates  transactions  between 
generators and distributors. In the free contracting environment, the chamber certifies quantity 
and price of electricity settled between generator and consumer. CCEE also holds spot market 
auctions to guarantee the liquidity of contracts between generator and final consumer
4. Although 
the greatest portion of the consumers (residential homeowners) is still unable to join the free 
contracting environment, the first steps towards an entirely competitive market have been made. 
The electrical sector became attractive for bio-electricity suppliers when Law 9,427/1996 
(and related decrees) defined the special consumer. According to the Law, special consumers are 
free customers interested in buying electricity from non-polluting sources such as windmills, 
solar  power  plants,  small  hydroelectric  mills  or  biomass  generators.  In  2002,  Law  10,438 
decreased the minimum power requirement for special consumers purchasing alternative energy 
                                                           
4 The spot market is better detailed in the appendix B 10 
 
to  500kW.  This  Law  has  broadened  the  bio-electricity  market  since  medium-sized  firms, 
shopping malls and hotels may now qualify as special consumers (ALMEIDA, 2006). 
The government has also stimulated the bio-electricity market by easing taxes paid by 
alternative  energy  suppliers  and  special  consumers.  Affecting  the  supply  side,  ANEEL  rule 
281/1999 has created a discount on the bio-generators’ bill. Law 9,991/2000 has enacted that the 
Research and Development tax will no longer be charged to alternative energy producers. On the 
demand side, Law 9,648 has created a discount in part of the special consumers’ electricity bill 
regarding the use of the distribution system. 
Beyond  these  government  incentives,  government  programs  have  facilitated  the 
development of bio-based energy production due to the unbalanced energy demand and supply 
profiles.  As  examples  of  the  national  concern,  in  2001  the  federal  government  imposed  a 
maximum electricity use per house to better match supply and demand structure. In November of 
2009 eighteen  states  of  Brazil  suffered  with  5  hours power  cut.  Sao  Paulo,  Rio  de Janeiro, 
Espirito Santo and Mato Grosso do Sul state had five hours of total power outage. The other 
fourteen states were partially affected. The unbalanced electricity profile has forced the federal 
government  and  several  state  governments  to  explore  innovative  programs  to  maintain  the 
energy  security  across  the  country  (SAMPAIO  et  al,  2005).  Commentators  argue  about  the 
effectiveness of these programs and which laws have been useful in the sense of creating the new 
electricity sector (PIRES, 1999). 
The most important program has perhaps been the Proinfa (Program of Incentives for 
Alternative Electricity Sources) created through Law 10,438/2002. This government program 
was  first  introduced  in  2002  and  it  has  provided  financial  opportunities  for  all  kinds  of 
alternative  electricity  enterprises.  As  proposed  in  the  program,  Eletrobrás  guarantees  the 11 
 
purchase  of  the  alternative  energy.  However,  alternative  energy  producers  have  preferred 
contracting directly to a final consumer (assisted by a broker registered at CCEE) because they 
may reach better returns. Under the same program, the government has also supported up to 80% 
of  the  investments  in  windmills,  biomass  generators  and  small  hydroelectric  mills  through 
BNDES loans (National Development Bank). Table 2 summarizes the major Laws and ANEEL 
rules related to the establishment of the Brazilian bio-electricity sector. 
 
Table 2: Legal and Institutional Changes in the Electrical Sector 
Law/Rule  Year  Details 
8,631  1993  electricity price no longer set by the State; price defined by the conceded 
companies. 
8,987  1995 
formalization of the Brazilian Privatization Plan 
setting conditions of competition in the electrical sector 
definition of free consumers 
definition of independent electricity producers 
9,074  1995  rights and obligations of conceded companies; 
  1996  RE-SEB Project 
9,427  1996  establishment of ANEEL; 
definition of special consumer. 
ANEEL 281  1999  abolish part of the distribution system use tax (TUSD)  for alternative 
energy producers 
9,648  1998 
creation of a 50% discount on the distribution system use tax (TUSD) for 
special consumers 
definition of rules for entry, taxes and market structure. Veto Law 8,631 
decrease of the minimum power requirement for special consumers to 
500kW regardless of the voltage. 
10,438  2002 
creation of Proinfa 
9,991  2000  waiver of R&D tax  
10,848  2004  establishment of CCEE. 
Source: ALMEIDA (2005) and Brazilian Federal Constitution 
 
BIO-ELECTRICITY GENERATION: THE INTEGRATED APPROACH  
Although  institutional  and  legal  changes  have  created  opportunities  for  biomass 
processors  to  diversify  its  production,  most  of  the  sugarcane  mills  did  not  truly  join  the 12 
 
electricity market until 2001. In the electrical sector, Law 9,074/1995 founded bio-electricity 
market  by  defining  free  consumers  and  independent  electricity  producers.  In  the  sugarcane 
sector, industry deregulation allowed players to explore new opportunities beyond sugar and 
ethanol. However, alternative producers had no economic incentives to join the market due to the 
well-structured hydropower supply and the balanced energy demand and supply profiles. 
The first alternative energy projects were launched when Proinfa guaranteed the purchase 
of bio-electricity production and offered low interest rate loans. Until the early 2000’s sugarcane 
mills had not invested in high pressure boilers and turbines for electricity production purposes, 
though they have had bagasse at their disposal. Along with Proinfa, greenhouse gas emissions, 
global climate change, local air pollution, and sustainability issues affected biomass processors’ 
decision  of  whether  or  not  to  start  producing  bio-electricity.  At  that  point,  the  legal  and 
institutional environment was set up for alternative electricity producers. Given the increasing 
demand for clean energy and the government financial support, sugarcane mills have found the 
economic incentive that was missing. Since 2003, firms have traded electricity directly with free 
consumers (assisted by CCEE) or Eletrobrás, under the auspices of Proinfa. 
Most of the sugarcane  processors joined the electrical sector  after 2007 when the 1
st 
Auction  of  Alternative  Energy  was  held  at  CCEE.  The  auction  indicated  that  bio-electricity 
generators  have  finally  become  a  reliable  source  of  power.  At  that  time,  eight  sugarcane 
processors and one generator using sawdust traded large-scale contracts with average revenue of 
R$14.2  million/year  (US$8.08  million/year)  and  average  price  of  R$138.93/MWh 
(US$79.02/MWh)
5. These contracts became official in January of 2010 when sugarcane firms 
started  delivering  electricity  to  distributors.  Table  3  shows  the  results  of  the  1
st  Auction  of 
Alternative Energy pointing out sellers, final prices, and revenue per year. 
                                                           
5 Exchange rate: BRL 1.758 = USD 1 (04/06/2010) 13 
 
Table 3: Auction report, 2007 





FENIX  Xanxere  S  25  138.50  27,484,500.00 
FLORALCO  Florida Paulista  SE  8  139.12  10,025,088.67 
GDA DEDINI  São João da B. Vista  SE  23  138.60  28,440,702.93 
LDC BIO R PRATA  Louis Dreyfus  SE  13  139.12  16,326,160.69 
LDC BIO R PRATA  Louis Dreyfus  SE  6  139.12  7,554,276.95 
LDC BIOENERGIA S/A  Louis Dreyfus  SE  10  139.12  12,558,585.15 
LDC BIOENERGIA S/A  Louis Dreyfus  SE  12  139.12  15,059,129.69 
PIONEIROS  Pioneiros II  SE  12  139.12  14,995,616.47 
USC STA CRUZ  Santa Cruz AB  SE  6  138.75  7,520,648.22 
USC STA CRUZ  Santa Cruz AB  SE  14  138.75  17,548,180.18 
USINA Ester  Ester  SE  7  138.90  8,740,027.84 
UTEIAC IACANGA  Iacanga  SE  4  138.94  4,923,696.00 
Source: CCEE (2010) 
 
Brazil has 423 sugarcane mills spread out across the country but 290 firms (69%) are 
regulated at ANEEL as power generators. Together those firms represent 4.75 GW of capacity of 
generation (4.11% of the Brazilian electric matrix). However, the actual share of bio-electricity 
traded through CCEE is smaller. Bio-electricity producers must also be regulated as sellers and 
registered at CCEE in order to be allowed to trade it. During the sugarcane harvesting season, 
facilities  consume  electricity  as  an  input  for  sugar  and  ethanol  production  and  trade  the 
remaining  part.  In  the  off-season,  facilities  do  not  produce  sugar  or  ethanol  due  to  weather 
constraints  and  maintenance  reasons  but  keep  producing  electricity  based  on  the  bagasse 
accumulated  over  the  season.  Depending  on  the  generation  technology  used,  the  amount  of 
energy produced over the season and off-season may not differ significantly. A study proposed 
by CTC (Sugarcane Technology Station) shows that the generation capacity of an individual 
plant in the harvesting season and off-season are 25MW and 26.3MW, respectively. The study 
considered  an  integrated  generation  plant  using  loose  bagasse  and  recovered  trash  as  inputs 
(LINERO et al., 2005). 14 
 
There are roughly 70 sugarcane mills that currently sell electricity to the grid. There are 
another 21 bioelectricity  generators under  construction, and 7 new projects of bio-electricity 
production  based  on  sugarcane  biomass  are  being  registered  in  Brazil  (CCEE,  2010).  The 
prediction for the largest biomass project being built is to generate 136 MW that can supply a 
city of 1.8 million people (RECCHIA, R. & ZAGO, 2010). Studies have also shown that if the 
whole sugarcane industry had efficient generators already installed, the capacity of production 
would  reach  7,000  MW  during  the  harvesting  season  which  coincides  with  the  shortage  in 
hydropower supply (rainfall driven) (NEVES & CONEJERO, 2010). 
Estimations made by UNICA (2010) show that only 1% of the processors’ total revenue 
came  from  bio-electricity  sales  in  2008/2009.  The  small  share  of  bio-electricity  in  the  total 
revenues can be partially explained because it is priced as a substitute for hydropower energy. It 
is expected that the biomass electricity will be better priced after 2012 (when the second run of 
the  Kyoto  Protocol  happens)  when  Brazil  ratifies  the  new  international  framework.  If  the 
ratification happens, companies will have their carbon emissions limited and they will have to 
find non-pollutant sources of energy in order to reach the national goal. Using bio-electricity will 
let them decrease their current carbon emissions and may give them opportunities to join the 
carbon market. Given these perspectives for alternative power, it is expected that the share of 
total revenues will increase to 16% by 2015/2016 (NEVES & CONEJERO, 2010). Sugarcane 
companies will also have a chance to sell climate credits (CER – Certified Emission Reductions) 





REMAINING STATE INTERVENTIONS 
  As presented in the second and third sections, the national government has decreased its 
interventions in the sugarcane industry and the electricity industry. However, federal and state-
level interventions are still being used as regulatory tools to promote bioenergy use. 
  The oil industry is also very influenced by government decisions. Under Brazilian Law, 
the government owns crude oil and natural gas reserves and concedes the right of exploring and 
refining Oil to Petrobrás. Although Petrobrás is a public company, the Brazilian government 
holds the majority of Petrobrás voting stock. In this sense, the federal government has autonomy 
to impose taxes or contributions to the oil industry in order to promote other sectors of the 
economy.  The  former  tax  called  PPE  (Specific  Price  Rate)  was  an  example  of  the  national 
government intervention. It was added to petroleum-based fuel prices and used as a subsidy to 
stimulate  the  production  and  consumption  of  hydrated  ethanol  which  could  be  offered  at 
competitive prices. PPE was terminated in August of 2000 due to oil industry pressures but a 
slightly modified tax (CIDE) was created through Law 10,336/2001 which has been imposed 
since then. Another national government intervention in the bioenergy market is the regulating 
amount of anhydrous ethanol to be mixed with pure gasoline across the country. This regulation 
has to be followed by retailers in order to stay in business. The current gasoline fuel offered at 
gas stations is 25% anhydrous ethanol.  
In the state level, government interventions are also found when analyzing the ICMS tax 
(good & sales tax) which can differ among the states. The ICMS tax for ethanol sales vary from 
12% in São Paulo state and can reach 25% in the northern states. Although sale taxes are not 
considered a market distortion, they can affect the flow of goods among states and be classified 
as local government intervention. 16 
 
  The CIDE tax and ethanol proportion rule for gasoline fuel are government tools used to 
promote  bioenergy  usage.  While  few  commentators  may  classify  these  government  tools  as 
market distortions (Business Week 2007), we believe that the creation of sustainable markets 




    Over the past twenty years both the electrical and sugarcane sector have shifted 
from the national regulated markets to competitive markets. However, investment decisions have 
been made at a faster pace than the deregulation process has been done. The CONSECANA 
model proposed by UNICA and ORPLANA in 1998 had considered only sugar and ethanol as 
final  outputs.  In  this  way,  sugarcane  has  been  valued  through  the  proposed  model  without 
considering any other final output like bio-electricity. 
  Since  2007,  an  increasing  number  of  sugarcane  mills  have  joined  the  bio-electricity 
market by using part of the fiber content of the residual from sugar and ethanol production. This 
means that the current CONSECANA model may be underpricing the sugarcane value when it is 
delivered at the processors’ gate. 
  Since  sugarcane  has  not  been  traded  as  a  commodity,  its  prices  are  not  affected  by 
diversified demands (i.e. ethanol production as a factor of changes in corn prices). Future studies 
may  tackle  the  sugarcane  valuation  model  by  comparing  gross  margins  (total  revenue  over 
sugarcane  price)  over  time.  The  results  may  suggest  interesting  insights  to  better  value 




  Within the last twenty years Brazil has gone through legal and institutional changes in 
both sugarcane and electrical sectors. Concerned with international dependency and unbalanced 
energy supply and demand profiles, the national government has created programs to meet the 
increasing demand using clean sources of energy. In the 1970’s Proálcool (the first bioenergy 
program promoted by the Brazilian government) supported the ethanol production and demand 
to  avoid  international  dependency  for  oil.  Recently,  Proinfa  supports  alternative  electricity 
supply  and  demand  by  facilitating  investments  and  easing  taxes  for  consumers.  The 
establishment of national organizations such as ANP, ANEEL and CCEE are also extremely 
important to guarantee the improvement of renewable energy markets. 
This paper contributes to the discussion of how government interventions have founded 
markets  for  renewable  energy  and  how  Brazil  has  become  one  of  the  most  self-sustainable 
energy users in the world. This discussion makes us reevaluate the criticism against institutional 












APPENDIX A: THE CONSECANA MODEL 
 
The  ATR  (Total  Recovered  Sugar)  is  a  technical  measure  of  sugarcane  quality  as  a 
function of sugar contents (SILVA, 1998). 
  ATR = 9.26288*PC + 8.8*AR 
where, 
ATR = Total Recovered Sugar; 
PC = Pol % sugarcane (amount of saccharose in the extracted juice); 
AR = Reducible sugar % cane: 
    AR = (9.9408 – 0.1049*Pr)*(1 – 0.01*F)*(1.0313 – 0.00575*F) 
where, 
Pr = Purity of extracted juice; 
F = Fiber % cane 
 
Then, the price for a metric-ton of sugarcane is defined by the formula: 
VTC = kg of ATR / (t*P%*VATR) 
where, 
VTC = price paid for a metric-ton of sugarcane; 
P% = percentage of sugarcane used for sugar + ethanol production or anhydrous + hydrated 
ethanol; 





APPENDIX B: THE SPOT MARKET HELD AT CCEE 
  As presented by ALMEIDA (2007), let us assume the following situation: 
A qualified consumer (C) is operating through the free contracting environment and he or 
she is located in the region where the distributor (D1) provides electricity. The same qualified 
consumer has contracted for electricity with generator (G) that is located in the region where the 
distributor (D2) is the energy provider. Then, the electricity is supplied from D1 to C that pays for 
the service of distribution to D1. G also pays for the service of distribution to D2. 
Every month C will publish his or her energy consumption. If the energy consumed is 
greater than the amount of energy contracted from G, C buys the difference of electricity through 
the spot market. If the energy consumed is lower than the amount contracted from G, C sells the 
difference using the same auction system in the spot market. 
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